Kevin Martin · Community Hospitals · Prescription Drug Costs

When One System Owns Every Hospital in the Region, That Is Not a Market. Nobody Is Enforcing It Like One.

Kevin Martin on hospital consolidation, why federal money has rewarded it, and what enforcing antitrust in health care would actually mean.

Over the last twenty years, a lot of independent hospitals and physician practices were acquired by large regional systems. In many parts of the country there is now effectively one system in a region — it owns the hospitals, employs the specialists, and runs the clinics.

Sometimes that is genuinely the only way a struggling facility stays open, and I am not going to pretend every acquisition was predatory.

But when one organization is the only buyer of physician labor and the only seller of hospital care in a region, that is not a competitive market. And the research on what happens next is not really in dispute: prices go up, and quality does not reliably follow.

According to US Government Accountability Office (GAO), at least 47% of physicians were affiliated with a hospital system in 2024 when compared to 30% in 2012. According to studies reviewed by GAO, Medicare spending rises due to facility fees and more expensive hospital-based settings, along with commercial insurer prices rising after consolidation (source - US Government Accountability Office). MedPAC also reports that in many markets, a single hospital system accounts for over 50% of inpatient admissions. (source - MedPAC) Large systems have leverage to negotiate higher commercial prices. In turn, physician-hospital integration has increased Medicare payments for physician services. And, according to MedPAC, Georgia's hospital market is among the most concentrated in the U.S. according to state-level analyses. (source - U.S. Government Accountability Office)

The part that makes me a little angry

Federal policy has not materially altered the trend and often rewarded consolidation rather than checking it.

Some payment rules pay more for the same service delivered in a hospital-owned setting than in an independent one. Same procedure, same physician, different rate depending on who owns the building. That is a direct financial incentive to acquire, created by federal payment policy.

So, the government helped build the concentration and then treats the resulting prices as a market outcome.

I do not think that was anyone's plan. It is the same pattern as the benefit cliff and the drug supply chain — individually defensible rules, nobody holding the aggregate, and a result nobody would have chosen on purpose. Without competitive safeguards, consolidation can and will continue to lead to rising costs without improving the quality of healthcare coverage. And this is most prevalent in an already concentrated market like Georgia.

What Congress actually controls

Antitrust enforcement is largely executive, run through the FTC and DOJ, but Congress funds those agencies, writes the underlying law, and conducts oversight of whether it is being enforced.

Congress also controls the payment rules that made consolidation profitable. Site-neutral payment — paying the same for the same service regardless of ownership — is a congressional decision. It has been proposed repeatedly and has not passed, and the reason is not mysterious.

What needs to change

Site-neutral payment. Same service, same rate, regardless of who owns the building. This removes the federal thumb on the scale and it saves money.

Enforce the law that exists. Health care mergers should get the same scrutiny as any other industry with this level of concentration. Fund the agencies to actually review them.

Look at what happened after. Retrospective review of completed mergers. Did prices rise, did service lines close, did quality move. We approve these on projections and almost never check the outcome. Again, accountability going back to fundamental audits. Not to find if something was done wrong, but to see if the results were as expected. If not, correct and put the controls in place to obtain the desired results. Ask the question, WHY. Why are we not getting the desired results?

Do not confuse this with the rescue cases. Some acquisitions kept a hospital open. The fix is a payment system that lets a community hospital survive independently — which is what I wrote about earlier — so that selling to the regional system is a choice rather than the only option.

How this ties together

This is the last of these I am writing, so let me connect it.

The community hospital cannot cover its costs because federal payment does not reflect what low-volume care costs. So, it sells to a regional system. The regional system gets paid more for the same service because of another federal rule. Concentration rises, prices rise, and a fund gets created to address the crisis — with 85 percent of it walled off from hospitals and patient care.

Every step is a federal decision. No single one is crazy. Together they produce a result nobody wanted. It is as simple as a kid's game of baseball. If the pitcher is getting hit, change the pitcher. If the pitcher cannot throw strikes, change the pitcher. But, sometimes, it is even more simple: adjust what the pitcher is doing in his delivery is all that it takes.

That is the whole argument of this campaign, and it is why I think the useful thing I can bring to that building is not a louder voice. It is somebody who reads the rules, adds them up, and says out loud what they actually produce. If the results are not what we expected or wanted, make the change. Measure the change and adjust accordingly.

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