Kevin Martin · Prescription Drug Costs

A Supply Chain You Cannot See Is Not a Supply Chain. It Is a Hope.

Kevin Martin on why critical drug and ingredient manufacturing concentrated overseas is an inventory risk, and what a serious domestic capacity policy would require.

If you have tried to fill a prescription in the last few years and been told it is on backorder, you have met this problem personally. I know, because I have run into this for my family.

A large share of the medications Americans take, and a larger share of the active ingredients that go into them, are manufactured overseas. Often in a small number of plants, in a small number of countries, sometimes in a single facility for a given ingredient.

I spent my career around inventory and suppliers, so let me put it the way I would put it in a management meeting. A single source, offshore, no visibility, no domestic fallback, on a product where the failure mode is a patient not getting a drug they need, is a failure as the first point - SINGLE SOURCE.

Nobody running a company would accept that on a component that mattered. We accepted it on medicine and we jeopardize the lives of loved ones and our own.

How it happened, without a villain

This was not a conspiracy. It was a series of individually rational cost decisions.

Manufacturing moved where it was cheaper. Each move made sense on its own. Nobody was responsible for looking at the aggregate picture and asking what happens if that region has a problem, because no one person owned the aggregate picture.

That is how most concentration risk happens. Not a bad decision — a hundred reasonable ones with nobody adding them up. This is what some call "Death by a thousand pin pricks".

Then something disrupts it and everybody discovers at once how thin the margin was.

From The United States Pharmacopeial Convention, numbers were released with data going back to 1982. According to Dr. Erkan Duman, a Senior Data Scientist with USP, a major shift has moved from US and EU on active API Drug Manufacturing to India and China, with this mostly occurring in the last decade. And as of 2024, India and China, who once had a zero presence, now have 43% and 45% respectively. US has only 3% and EU 9%. From the US Department of State, as of 2025 the active shortage list contained a historical high of 270 drugs, and the USP similar analysis reported 75 drugs in shortage, yet the FDA is the official count and is considered the authoritative federal figure. But the FDA does not publish comprehensive, public, facility-level concentration or geographic-distribution data for API or finished-dosage manufacturing. A 2024 GAO report found the US "lacks manufacturing visibility for 63% of critical drugs". (source - US Department of State).

As of April 2026, the President of the United States of America issued a proclamation stating the issue related to API and key starting materials are "being imported into United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States." And under this proclamation has directed the Secretary of HHS and other senior officials to pursue negotiations of agreements of related issues. Full disclosure of proclamation can be found on www.whitehouse.gov by looking at presidential actions, proclamations from April 2nd, 2026.

What Congress actually controls

More than people assume.

Congress funds and directs FDA, which inspects manufacturing facilities including foreign ones. It can require supply chain disclosure so that somebody knows where a critical drug is actually made. It sets procurement rules for federal purchasers, which are large enough to move a market. It writes the tax and incentive structure that determines whether building a plant here pencils out.

It can also require the thing that is missing most: a list. Which drugs are critical, where they are made, and how much single-source exposure exists on each. Right now, that picture is far less complete than most people would guess.

What needs to change

Build the inventory first. Before subsidizing anything, know what is critical and where it is made. You cannot manage exposure you have not measured. This is cheap and it has not been done properly. Again, another fundamental aspect of business operations - AUDIT.

Use federal purchasing power. The federal government buys an enormous volume of medication. Contract preferences for domestically manufactured critical drugs create demand without a new subsidy program.

Be honest about cost. Domestic manufacturing costs more. Anyone who tells you we can bring it home and lower prices at the same time is not being straight. What you buy with that cost is reliability, and I think for critical drugs that is worth paying for. But say it out loud.

Focus on critical, not everything. Trying to reshore all pharmaceutical manufacturing is not realistic and would raise costs broadly for little benefit. The list of things where a shortage is genuinely dangerous is much shorter, and that is where the effort belongs.

Why this connects to the price argument

I wrote earlier that we pay more than anyone else for the same drugs. This is the other side.

We accepted a system that gave us high prices and fragile supply at the same time. Usually, you get one or the other — pay more for reliability or pay less and accept risk. We managed to arrange both downsides.

That is not ideology. That is what happens when nobody is holding the whole picture.

Which, if you have read anything else I have written, is the thing I keep saying about Washington generally. And I keep posing the one thing nobody is asking, WHY? Why are politicians not acting on information that is available and proactively protecting United States citizens from something as simple as supply and demand?

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